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Key Messages and Executive Summary  
In light of the objective to have an entirely carbon-free power sector by 2050, general 
consensus holds that such a major technological transformation will require considerable 
investment, some of which will replace carbon-intensive capacity with more flexible, less 
carbon-intensive forms of power generation. This is reflected in the ongoing EU discussions 
on wholesale market design, retail market regulation, structural reform of the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) and the “2030 framework for climate and energy policies.” With the 
drive towards a low-carbon economy, the electricity market needs to make a positive 
contribution to the successful delivery of these new policy objectives. It is necessary to 
understand how the low-carbon economy will be brought about, notably what market rules 
(‘market design’) will be required and whether there is a need to adapt the current framework. 
Making the market fit for the low-carbon transition  
At the core of the current market design is an energy-only market, which remunerates energy 
delivered. Such a market attracts investment in new capacity both through direct and indirect 
reliance on price signals. Indirect reliance refers to market participants entering into 
commercial arrangements with each other in order to hedge their exposure to price and 
volume risk. Historically, unexpected policy interventions, erroneous demand expectations 
and long lead times for planning and building new capacity have led to boom and bust cycles, 
i.e. times of overcapacity alternating with times of scarce capacity. The ETS has been designed 
as the principle tool to ensure that investments are increasingly low-carbon, by providing a 
price signal for the long-term scarcity of carbon. Moreover, forward markets exist, offering 
the possibility to trade long-term contracts for physical delivery or financial hedging against 
the prices of short-term markets. Currently, the commitment periods available for such 
contracts seldom go far beyond one year and the liquidity of forward contracts with a delivery 
date of more than three years in the future has been negligible.  
In the last 15 years, gas and renewables made up 91% of new capacity additions. Yet 
investment decisions for these two technology groups have not been triggered in the same 
way. So far, EU member states have primarily relied on dedicated policy instruments to 
support the deployment of renewables. Thus investments in renewables have mostly not been 
triggered by wholesale price signals based on internal energy market regulation and the ETS.  
The challenge of investing in low-carbon 
Today, the full costs of low-carbon technologies are above wholesale market prices. This raises 
two questions. The first question is how low-carbon investment will be triggered in the future. 
Secondly, even if this gap between full costs and market prices is closed – as a result of further 
decrease of technology costs or an increase in carbon, coal and gas prices – the question of 
efficient financing remains. Many stakeholders and some EU member states argue that the 
cost structure of some low-carbon technologies requires a different investment trigger than 
the wholesale price. Technologies such as wind and solar have high upfront costs and close-
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to-zero variable production costs. This means that capital costs have a proportionally greater 
impact on the total costs of such technologies than they have on coal or gas generation. At the 
same time, there are two side effects of using dedicated support policies. First, when the 
market is already well supplied and demand is not growing,1 they add to surplus capacity, 
reducing the demand for electricity generated from existing conventional sources. Second, 
there is more fluctuation of demand for electricity from conventional sources, because 
renewable generation depends to some extent on weather conditions.  
The challenge of investing in conventional resources 
Decreasing hours of operation of conventional power plants create a need for a different mix 
of conventional generation technologies, as these do not just differ in their variable production 
costs but also in their fixed and investment costs. So-called ‘base-load’ capacity is used to 
cover the minimum continuous level of electricity demand, as it has relatively low variable 
but high fixed and investment costs. Consequently, when hours of operation diminish, some 
base-load would be expected to be replaced with capacity that has lower fixed costs (so-called 
'mid-merit' and ‘peak-load' capacity).  
The business case of peak-load is generally considered challenging, because investment costs 
have to be recovered from a low number of hours of operation. What’s changing with 
renewables is that (i) more of these units will be needed and (ii) the exact amount required is 
subject to greater uncertainty than today due to the weather-dependent availability of 
renewables. Moreover, in the competition for the remaining market share of mid-merit 
technologies, the more flexible sources with their higher production costs are currently losing 
out and the business case for them is becoming more challenging. 
Solutions  
Stakeholders generally agree that there is a lack of proper implementation of the existing 
framework. Among the shared recommendations are: 
 Fully and properly implement the current market design (standardisation of products, 
harmonisation and relaxation of price caps,2 improved price formation in energy and 
balancing markets, coupling of intraday and balancing markets). 
 Improve the functioning of short-term markets to allow for a level playing field 
between demand, conventional supply and renewable supply. 
 Expose every generator to the same obligations and risks. 
                                                   
1 Overall EU electricity demand has been rather stagnant over the last three years, despite the fact that 
the EU economy has started to recover (in terms of GDP growth). Part of the 2008-09 decline may thus 
be structural. 
2 More recently, 12 EU member states have agreed not to introduce any legal price caps (see BMWi 
2015). For technical reasons, power exchanges will still have to define a maximum market price, i.e. a 
technical price cap. 
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 Strengthen the EU ETS in order to provide more predictable long-term signals; this 
will also serve as a market-exit signal for carbon-intensive capacity. Different views 
exist on how to best achieve this. 
 Remove market-exit barriers where they exist. 
These measures will address the existing shortcomings, to an extent. Coupling markets and 
harmonising price caps will lead to a better use of cross-border resources, thus increasing 
market efficiency. Removing price distortions, exposing all market participants to the same 
risks and removing market-exit barriers will improve price formation in energy and balancing 
markets. In order for these measures to be effective, however, market rules have to be set EU-
wide or at least regionally. They will also need to be implemented.  
Market-driven investments require a stable and predictable long-term framework. The EU 
challenge will be to instil confidence that these rules are in fact stable and that market 
outcomes, especially in terms of wholesale prices and security of supply levels, will not 
eventually trigger public intervention. In order to achieve this, it is important that – 
irrespective of which approach will be chosen – this framework is based on evidence and, 
ideally, enjoys the support of the broadest possible stakeholder group. 
Important open questions  
There was controversy over two critical points: i) how to treat overcapacity and ii) the 
potential need for capacity mechanisms to support investment, i.e. explicitly remunerating 
availability.3 The Task Force discussed them in depth but no consensus was possible. The 
report therefore describes the options. CEPS will return to these points separately.  
These controversies are central to the debate of the market design fit for the transition to a 
low-carbon economy, i.e. a stable and predictable long-term framework conducive to 
investment. On the first point, i.e. overcapacity, some argued that policies are needed to 
accelerate the retirement of capacity, mainly base-load capacity. Others held that the market 
eventually will achieve this on its own, provided there are no exit barriers. Similarly, there 
was no agreement on the second point – the need for capacity mechanisms. From the 
perspective of the EU’s internal market, there is political urgency to settle these two 
controversies, however. Some member states have started putting national measures in place, 
for example in the fields of capacity markets, long-term contracts or approaches to address 
overcapacity. At this point, it is essential to understand how differing national choices can co-
exist and what level of standardisation and harmonisation is required. Otherwise, the 
likelihood of market fragmentation increases.   
  
                                                   
3 Evidence and analysis are provided in chapter 5. It is important to note that different member states 
will take different views on whether the question of how to trigger investment is more important than 
the question of how to deal with overcapacity. 
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1 Introduction 
The EU has repeatedly confirmed its position that the global, annual mean surface 
temperature should not increase by more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. To develop 
consistent emissions reduction trajectories up to 2050, the European Commission has worked 
out road maps. Many member states as well as industry sectors have done the same.  
One of the recurrent key messages of all road maps is the major contribution of the EU’s power 
sector. According to the EU low-carbon road map,4 its role in final energy consumption would 
have to double and moreover be entirely carbon-free by 2050 to achieve the EU’s agreed 
objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions domestically by 80-95% compared to 1990. 
Such a major technological transformation can only succeed with continuous investment in 
low-carbon technologies and a phase-out of existing, carbon-intensive technologies.  
Following the 2009 “2020 climate and energy package”, there had been hope that especially 
the Directives on the Internal Energy Market together with the ETS, would lead to 
convergence and integration of member states’ energy markets, fostering affordability and 
security of supply. The ETS would provide the price signal to modernisation by driving low-
carbon investment, fuel switching and other efficiency measures, thereby reinforcing security 
of supply and enhancing competitiveness. The reality is different. The carbon price signal of 
the ETS has proven to be too weak to have a lasting effect either on new investment or on the 
retirement of carbon-intensive capacity. Moreover, when implementing the 2020 climate and 
energy package, member states have taken different national policy approaches that are 
sometimes inconsistent and incompatible with each other. 
Unilateral national action has also hindered the gradual completion of the internal market for 
electricity, envisaged to be completed by the end of 2014. A lack of proper implementation of 
internal market rules, combined with the – politically desired – rapid expansion of new, 
largely intermittent renewable energy sources, has made many stakeholders raise the question 
of how EU power markets should be designed to ensure the achievement of EU energy and 
climate policy objectives. Opinions diverge over whether the solution lies in a better 
implementation of the current rules or a new market design. 
The European Council confirmed its previous emission reduction trajectory in October 2014, 
when it decided on a set of targets for 2030 by adopting the “2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies.”5 As a result, the share of renewables is expected to considerably increase 
even until 2030. If the power sector continues to contribute in a similar way as today, the 
                                                   
4 See COM(2011) 112 final. 
5 The European Council decision includes binding targets for (i) domestically reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 40% by 2030 compared to 1990, (ii) increasing the share of renewables to 27%, (iii) an 
indicative target to improve energy efficiency by at least 27% compared to ‘business-as-usual’ 
projections of the future energy demand, and (iv) a 15% interconnection target. 
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overall 27% renewables target would translate into a target share of at least 45% of renewable 
electricity by 2030 compared to a share of 25% in 2013.6  
This CEPS Task Force Report focuses on whether there is a need to adapt the EU’s electricity 
market design and if so, the options for doing so. In a first step, it will analyse the current 
market trends by distinguishing between their causes and their consequences (chapter 2). 
Then, the current blueprint of EU power market design – the target model – is briefly 
introduced (chapter 3). In chapter 4, shortcomings of the current approach are identified, 
followed by a discussion of the challenges in finding suitable solutions. Chapter 5 offers an 
inventory of solutions differentiating between recommendations shared among Task Force 
members and non-consensual options. 
Appendix 1 consists of a Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations. Appendix 2 lists all 
Task Force members.  
                                                   
6 Source: Eurostat (2015). 
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2 Shared analysis of current market trends 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of current market trends by carefully 
distinguishing between the underlying causes of these developments and the subsequent 
consequences they have for market participants and social welfare. This will help to 
distinguish between causes that entail a failure and, hence, need to be tackled in a potential 
policy intervention and causes that should be accepted as normal market dynamics. 
2.1 Recent market trends: Decreased wholesale prices as well as increased spread 
between retail and wholesale prices 
The dilemma of the current EU power market design can be better understood by analysing 
two opposing trends: on the one hand, we have observed a strong decrease of wholesale 
market prices from 2008 to 2014 in many EU member states (see the examples of Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain in Figure 1); on the other hand, retail market prices have increased in 
the same period of time, especially in the residential sector7 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Wholesale power prices8 in selected EU member states (2008-14) 
 
 
                                                   
7 Retail prices for industrial consumers are typically lower than for residential consumers. 
8 Sources: EEX (2015), GME (2015), OMEL (2015). 
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Figure 2. Retail prices for households in selected EU member states (2008-14) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2015), annual electricity consumption between 2,500 and 5,000 kWh, nominal prices. 
2.2 Causes 
Wholesale market prices 
The main causes for the decrease of wholesale prices from 2008 to 2014 are 1) decreased coal 
prices,9 2) an oversupply of carbon allowances resulting in a decrease of carbon allowance 
prices10 and 3) overcapacity of power production plants, putting downward pressure on 
wholesale prices. Overcapacity was, in turn, caused by lower-than-expected electricity 
demand, over-investment, the injection of new capacity through dedicated policy 
instruments11 and the continuing improvement in the field of coupling national electricity 
markets.12 While there is general consensus on these three causes, Task Force members do not 
agree which of these causes has had the greatest impact on the decline of wholesale prices. 
Lower coal prices imply lower production costs for coal-fired power stations. This affects 
market prices, when a coal-based plant sets the market price. In the examined period, the 
                                                   
9 The German import border price for hard coal can be used an indicator for this decrease. From 2008 
to 2014, it decreased by 35% (€13.8 per MWhth to €9 per MWhth). A major cause for this price drop is 
the reduced demand for coal in the US power sector, where coal was mostly replaced with cheap, 
unconventional gas. 
10 The average price for carbon allowances was €6 per tonne in 2014, down from roughly €23 per tonne 
in 2008 (-73%).  
11 This is sometimes referred to as ‘merit-order effect’. 
12 Market coupling leads to more efficient use of cross-border resources. Provided that there is sufficient 
interconnection and that demand peaks do not occur simultaneously, this can put downward pressure 
on prices. 
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price-setting technology has either been gas-based or coal-based during the vast majority of 
hours.13 Whether coal or gas sets the market price depends on the variable production costs 
for these fuels (including CO2 costs) and on their respective share in installed capacity.14 From 
2008 to 2014, the competitiveness of an average coal-fired power station15 vis-à-vis a brand-
new gas-fired power station16 has increased. Variable production costs (including CO2 costs) 
of an average coal-fired plant decreased from €53 to €27 per MWh in the examined period, 
whereas production costs of a highly efficient gas-fired power station decreased only from 
€53 to €41 per MWh. Consequently, countries with a high share of coal-fired capacity in their 
power system have experienced an increase in the share of coal-fired electricity generation 
and a decrease in market prices. This development was also facilitated by the low price for 
carbon allowances. 
In general, varying prices for energy carriers such as 
gas and coal should be considered a normal market 
development. Market participants have sufficient 
possibilities to hedge against the volatility of coal or 
gas prices.  
Variations in the price for carbon allowances should 
also be seen as a normal element of the ETS, which is 
a volume-based instrument. However, many argue 
that the main cause of the current oversupply of 
carbon allowances lies in the absence of supply-side 
flexibility of the ETS. Since supply of carbon 
allowances was fixed ex ante, the drop in demand (resulting from the 2008-09 economic crisis) 
led to a decrease in carbon allowance prices. The impact of deploying renewables on the 
demand for carbon allowances has been limited. This is because the cap of the ETS has been 
designed to be consistent with the planned contribution of renewables in decreasing emissions. 
Thus only overachieving the targeted contribution would reduce the demand for carbon 
allowances (see Box 1).  
Flexibility on the supply-side would be needed in order to avoid a carbon lock-in.17 To address 
this, the European Commission is close to adopt the so-called ‘Market Stability Reserve’, to 
                                                   
13 One can argue that a price of zero or negative prices indicate that subsidised renewables have set the 
price. For Germany, this was the case in around 1% of the hours in 2014. 
14 In practice, this means wholesale market prices reflect the structure of generation capacity mix to a 
certain extent. Italy, for instance, benefits less than Germany from a fall in coal prices, since the thermal 
generation capacity mix in Italy is not dominated by coal but natural gas. Thus coal is less likely to set 
the price. 
15 The average conversion efficiency of coal-fired stations in Germany currently amounts to 41%. 
16 The highest conversion efficiency of a gas-fired station (combined cycle) currently amounts to 60%. 
17 In the absence of a clear economic signal for decarbonisation, this term refers to a possible scenario 
of overinvesting in carbon-intensive technologies in the short term. Given the rather long economic 
lifetime of assets in the power sector, this scenario entails relatively high emissions in the medium term, 
Causes (wholesale market prices) 
 Decreased coal price 
 Oversupply of carbon allowances 
 Overcapacity (lower-than-expected 
power demand, over-investment, 
injection of new capacity through 
policy instruments, improved 
functioning of internal market) 
Causes (retail market prices) 
 Increase in taxes and levies 
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match the demand variability with a mechanism that should allow for adapting supply to 
demand, thus allowing volume-based control on the carbon price. 
A third cause for the decrease in wholesale prices is overcapacity. The 2008-09 economic crisis 
was accompanied by an unparalleled drop in electricity demand. At the end of 2012, the 
electricity demand in the EU-27 was still 3% lower than in 2008. Back in 2008, analysts were 
expecting an annual growth rate of 1.5% (Capros et al., 2008). Thus the divergence between 
projected and realised values amounts to roughly 9%. 
Demand forecasts were also created by each EU member state in the context of their national 
renewable energy action plans (NREAPs). These plans had to be notified to the European 
Commission by 30 June 2010 and contain detailed road maps of how the national, legally 
binding 2020 target was expected to be reached – distinguishing between contributions of the 
power, heating and transport sectors. As illustrated in Figure 3, demand had largely been 
overestimated from the beginning. Apparently, national governments were expecting a quick 
recovery of the demand after the crisis – a scenario that has not materialised. In 2013, the 
divergence between planned and actual values amounted to more than 10% in the energy 
efficiency case (low demand) and to more than 13% in the reference case (high demand). In 
absolute terms, this gap roughly corresponds to the electricity consumption of the United 
Kingdom in 2013. Despite the fact that the EU economy has started to recover (in terms of 
GDP growth), electricity demand has been rather stagnant over the last three years. Thus part 
of the decline appears to be structural. 
Figure 3. Expected vs. actual electricity demand in the EU-28 (2005-20)18 
 
                                                   
i.e. a carbon lock-in, unless the installations remain idle or are decommissioned before their lifetime is 
exhausted, which is considered a waste of economic resources. 
18 Sources: NREAPs (2010), Eurostat (2015). 
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A short-term effect of lower-than-expected electricity demand is that units with relatively high 
(variable) production costs are no longer needed to cover demand, thus lowering wholesale 
prices. Moreover, some market participants overinvested in new capacity, putting additional 
downward pressure on prices.  
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At the same time, we have also observed a massive deployment of renewables as mandated 
by the Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), which set targets for the use of renewable energy 
in each EU member state. National governments subsequently implemented subsidy systems 
for renewables in order to ensure that their domestic targets are met. Unless other plants are 
Box 1. Deployment of renewables on track as of 2014 
An analysis of the 28 national renewable energy action plans (NREAPs) reveals that the 
increase in electricity production from renewable sources has proceeded as projected in 
absolute terms (see Figure 4). At the same time, due to the lower-than-expected electricity 
demand, the share of renewable electricity in total electricity demand is higher than 
anticipated in 2010. In 2013, the actual share in the EU-28 was 27%, whereas the projected 
share was 23% for that year, according to the NREAPs. 
It is important to note that the increase in other sectors, i.e. heating, cooling and 
transportation, has not materialised as projected. Most EU member states are especially 
falling short of the projected share of renewables in transport. Overall, i.e. considering all 
sectors, the actual share of renewables in gross final energy consumption amounted to 15% 
in 2013, which is just one percentage point above the projected share for that year (14%). 
While the EU as a whole is on track, the situation varies from member state to member 
state. To reach their respective national target for 2020, member states may have to adapt 
their support strategy but could also make use of cooperation mechanisms, namely 
statistical transfers. 
Figure 4. Expected vs. actual electricity production from renewable sources in the EU-28 
(2005-20) 
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retired, such an injection of new capacity through dedicated policy instruments will have a 
similar impact on conventional generators: a decline of electricity demand.19 On the one hand, 
one can argue that the impact of this deployment was largely to be anticipated, at the latest 
since the 2009 adoption of the “2020 climate and energy package”. On the other hand, the 
power sector is, as of 2013, contributing to the overall 20% target to a greater extent than 
anticipated in 2010 – albeit counterbalancing the lower-than-expected contribution of 
renewables in heating, cooling and transportation (see Box 1). 
Retail market prices 
A retail price consists of several components. Typically, one distinguishes between 
production-related costs (‘energy and supply’), network costs, levies and taxes. Thus the first 
component is linked to the wholesale price. National regulation has a significant impact on at 
least three out of four components. Therefore, conditions vary from member state to member 
state but also from consumer type to consumer type. For instance, some industrial consumers 
are granted exemptions from paying certain levies. Nevertheless, by decomposing the 
electricity bill of residential consumers in Germany and Italy, interesting observations can be 
made (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Components of retail prices for residential consumers in Germany20 and Italy21 
(2008-14) 
 
                                                   
19 The same considerations can be applied to the UK announcement of financing the deployment of 
nuclear power using a dedicated policy instrument. 
20 Source: BNetzA & BKartA (2014), annual consumption: 3,500 kWh. 
21 Source: AEEGSI (2014), annual consumption: 2,700 kWh, peak load: 3 kW. 
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In both cases, the increase in retail prices is primarily caused by an increase in levies (+198% 
in Germany, +189% in Italy) and to a lesser extent by an increase in taxes (+24%, +6%) and 
network costs (+10%, +26%). Production-related costs decreased for Italian household 
consumers (-15%), while they increased for German household consumers (+9%). As a result, 
the cost component related to the wholesale market price has less weight in the end-consumer 
price than in 2008.  
A similar trend, i.e. a decreased importance of the wholesale price, can be observed for 
electricity consumers throughout the EU, as indicated by a recent study of Eurelectric.22 In 
some countries, tax increases have contributed more to this development than in Italy or 
Germany, where an increase in levies has been the main driver. An example is Portugal, where 
VAT alone increased from 6% to 23% in 2011. For the EU as a whole, network tariffs have 
increased moderately by 17% from 2008 to 2012.23 In the same period, transmission-related 
costs have risen by less than 12%, which implies that the increase in distribution tariffs has 
been greater than the increase in transmission tariffs.24 
2.3 Consequences 
Consequences for generators 
Compared to 2008, conventional generators 1) sold 
electricity at a lower price and 2) sold less electricity in 
2014. The latter is caused by the contraction in market 
share. Electricity generated from conventional 
sources has either been replaced by electricity from 
renewable sources or is simply not needed anymore 
because of lower electricity demand.  
For generators, selling electricity at a lower wholesale price can, i.e. does not necessarily, mean 
that their profit margins25 go down. As outlined in the previous section, lower prices for coal 
or gas are one possible cause for lower wholesale prices. In this case, lower wholesale prices 
are accompanied by lower production costs for some generation technologies. The exact 
impact on a generator’s profits depends on his individual fuel mix and should be considered 
a normal market risk, which does not justify the need for policy intervention. For the price of 
carbon, the situation is different, as the lower price is to a great extent a result of an ETS design 
not fit for its purpose. 
In a market that is already well served and where demand is not growing, dedicated support 
policies effectively reduce the demand for other sources of power generation. Therefore, the 
                                                   
22 See Magyar & Lorubio (2014). 
23 Ibid. 
24 See ENTSO-E (2014). 
25 We use the term “profit margin” as a synonym for “gross margin” throughout this report. The gross 
margin is defined as the differential between the market price and the variable production costs of a 
power plant. Thus it is used to cover fixed maintenance costs and recover investment costs. 
Consequences 
 Generators: selling at lower prices, 
selling less electricity 
 Higher net support costs for 
renewables 
 Disincentive to invest in retail 
storage and demand-response  
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impact on a conventional generator’s profit margin is always negative in the short term. 
Moreover, some power plants become unprofitable to run and are consequently mothballed 
or decommissioned, especially where no market-exit barriers exist. In order for overcapacity 
to be temporary, excess conventional capacity must be allowed to retire, however. 
The relevant design question for the short term is whether the current market rules ensure 
that (1) surplus capacity can be retired, (2) the ‘right’ capacity26 is retired and (3) sufficient 
capacity stays online. Following the market mechanics and given the current spread between 
coal and gas prices as well as present carbon allowance prices, gas-fired power stations are 
more affected from this development than coal-fired plants. This is a result of variable 
production costs of gas-based stations being higher despite being less carbon-intensive than 
coal. Some market participants consider this an undesirable development, since a thermal 
generating mix dominated by carbon-intensive fuels is inconsistent with meeting established 
policy objectives for 2030 and beyond. 
Higher net support costs for renewables 
A decrease in wholesale prices can increase the net support costs for renewables (depending 
on how the support system for renewables is designed), which in turn increases retail prices. 
As discussed in the previous section, the increase in retail prices was mainly caused by an 
increase in taxes and levies. It is difficult to provide an analysis for the EU as a whole due to 
the fact that the exact causes differ from member state to member state and from consumer 
type to consumer type. Yet evaluating the consequences for residential consumers in Germany 
and Italy reveals some insight into the interconnection between wholesale and retail prices 
and how wholesale prices affect net support costs for renewables.  
For households in Italy and Germany, the increase in levies was mainly needed to finance the 
deployment of renewables through dedicated support systems. In 2014, the surcharge for 
financing renewables amounted to €62 per MWh for German households (75% of all levies) 
and to €34 per MWh for Italian households (85% of all levies). However, the decline of 
wholesale prices also plays a role, as this decline results in a reduced market value of 
renewable electricity. In Germany and partly in Italy, support systems for renewables are 
designed such that they allow investors to recover their full costs.27 In practice, this means 
plant owners are compensated for the difference between the wholesale market price and a 
fixed remuneration level.28 This differential is referred to as net support costs and is passed on 
                                                   
26 In order to restore market equilibrium, it is essential that there is a right mix between base-load, mid-
merit and peak-load capacity (see section 4.2, “Dealing with overcapacity”). 
27 This is generally the case for support systems based on a feed-in tariff or a contract for difference 
(currently active in Germany and also partly in the UK and Italy) but not for a support system based 
on green certificates (currently active in Norway and Sweden and also partly in Italy).  
28 Strictly speaking, the above-mentioned case only applies to a contract-for-difference system, where 
generators receive a premium on top of the wholesale market price. In a feed-in tariff system, generators 
are not exposed to market prices. However, in that case a third party such as the grid operator is in 
charge of the commercialisation of the electricity produced. This party is compensated for the gap 
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to consumers. Therefore, the net support costs for renewables would have been lower without 
a decline of wholesale prices.  
This effect can be assessed quantitatively, provided that a detailed decomposition of costs and 
revenues of the support system is available – broken down into all supported renewable 
energy sources. This is the case for Germany starting from 2010.29 Evaluating reports of 
German transmission system operators (TSOs) reveals, for instance, that the average market 
value of solar power amounted to €42 per MWh in 2014, down from €64 per MWh in 2010.30 
Assuming wholesale market prices from 2010, the necessary net support costs could have been 
€2 billion lower in the last year. As a result, a reduced levy of €57 per MWh (instead of €62) 
would have been sufficient to allow renewable energy investors to recover their full costs. 
Put differently, a possible future increase in wholesale prices would partly be counterbalanced 
by a decrease of the levy used to finance the deployment of renewables. 
Disincentive to invest in retail storage and demand-response 
Storage generates revenues by charging during times of low prices and discharging during 
times of high prices. Similarly, demand-response can create value by shifting consumption 
from times of high prices to times of low prices.  
The main challenge for storage and demand-response is that today’s wholesale prices are 
relatively low and flat. Moreover, the retail pricing mechanism has an impact on the economic 
viability of storage and demand-response. To illustrate this in more detail, it is useful to 
distinguish between (1) bulk storage operating in the transmission grid, (2) ‘retail storage’ 
operating in the distribution grid, (3) demand-response and (4) local storage strictly used to 
optimise self-consumption.31 
                                                   
between the market price and fixed feed-in tariff. As in a contract-for-difference system, this differential 
is typically passed on to consumers. 
29 See 50Hertz et al. (2015). 
30 The main underlying figures for this assessment are: (1) expected base-load price for 2010 (in 2009): 
€54 per MWh, (2) expected base-load price for 2014 (in 2013): €41 per MWh, (3) expected market value 
coefficient for solar in 2010: 120% and (4) expected market value coefficient for solar in 2014: 101%. 
31 This refers to the consumption by auto-producers of electricity, which they themselves produce. 
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Figure 6. Wholesale market prices grouped by hour of the day (Germany, 2008 and 2014) 
 
Today, the dominant bulk storage technology is pumped hydro. It is typically connected to 
the transmission grid and therefore not considered as a ‘normal’ consumer, i.e. no retail taxes 
and levies arise when charging a pumped hydro station. Depending on national regulation, 
grid fees may have to be paid. Thus bulk storage is primarily driven by the dynamics of 
wholesale prices. In some countries, peak prices have decreased more than valley prices at 
wholesale level. This means that the spread between high prices (occurring at noon) and low 
prices (occurring at night) has declined (see Figure 6 for an illustration of the German case). 
As a result, it has become increasingly less attractive to operate existing bulk storage; investing 
in new units is considered economically unviable in countries where price spreads are the 
main source of income for storage.32  
For batteries operating in the distribution grid and offering services to end-consumers, retail 
prices apply. This means that every time such a storage unit is charged, a price that includes 
taxes, grid fees, a surcharge for renewables and other levies has to be paid. As a result, the 
economic benefit of operating retail storage today is lower than in 2008 – not just because of 
reduced price spreads at wholesale level but also because the share of taxes and levies in the 
overall price has increased. At present, there is virtually no storage at retail level. Regarding 
economic viability, similar considerations can be applied to demand-response, provided that 
consumption is not just reduced in times of high prices but shifted to periods with low prices.  
                                                   
32 Repowering, i.e. upgrading existing stations, is considered economically viable in some cases, notably 
in Portugal. Moreover, additional sources of revenues, e.g. from providing ancillary services, can make 
a difference. 
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A potentially emerging technology is local storage. This refers to batteries that are used to 
optimise self-consumption, i.e. used to shift electricity produced locally, for instance from 
solar panels. In this case, storage is not exposed to retail prices. If retail prices continue to rise, 
it may become increasingly beneficial to invest in decentralised generation and local storage, 
depending on the retail pricing mechanism and whether grid tariffs are applied in a way that 
reflects the cost structure of grids. 
On the one hand, the current retail pricing mechanism is a disincentive to invest in retail 
storage or demand-response, because taxes and levies are mostly allocated based on the 
electricity consumed. On the other hand, such a pricing mechanism can be considered as an 
incentive to invest in local storage, i.e. storage located ‘behind the meter’ to avoid being 
exposed to taxes and levies. A side effect, however, is that the flexibility of these storage units 
would not be available to the system, which is undesirable. 
In the context of local storage and self-consumption, two well-differentiated issues can be 
identified, both of them related to a potential misalignment of savings between the system 
and the end-consumer: 
 Retail prices include costs unrelated to electricity supply. As a result, self-consumption 
leads to potential consumer savings that do not necessarily correspond to actual 
system savings, because those costs unrelated to electricity supply will simply be 
incurred by the remaining end-consumers. 
 The retail price structure does not fully reflect the system cost structure. Some system 
cost components are fixed and not variable costs, i.e. these are not related to 
consumption. Grid access costs are, for instance, mostly fixed costs. If this is not 
reflected in the retail pricing mechanism, self-consumption will produce consumer 
savings that do not necessarily correspond to actual system savings. 
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3 Current blueprint for EU power market design: the target model 
The target model is an EU-wide blueprint for the integration of national and regional power 
markets. Its main elements are briefly introduced in the following sections. 
3.1 Marketplaces 
In liberalised energy systems such as the EU, parts of the US, South America or Australia, 
short-term markets for the physical delivery of electricity exist. They are considered short-term, 
which means that the time horizon is one day or less. There is usually a day-ahead and an 
intraday market, where electricity can be contracted for delivery during the upcoming or the 
current day, respectively. The day-ahead marketplace is considered sufficiently33 liquid34 in 
most EU member states. This means there is a sufficiently large number of buyers and sellers 
willing to trade at all times, which is essential for a market to be competitive and efficient. In 
these markets, generators are remunerated based on energy delivered, while the demand-side 
is charged for the energy consumed.35  
Balancing power is needed in any power system to maintain a balance between production 
and consumption close to real-time. In liberalised power systems, grid operators have to 
procure this balancing power in a transparent and competitive way, i.e. in balancing power 
markets. Depending on national regulation balancing power markets sometimes offer 
remuneration for the availability of power. This is the 
case for primary, secondary and tertiary reserves in 
Germany, for example. However, these are short-
term contracts with a maximum commitment period 
of one week and, more important, very small 
markets with a volume that is in the range of 3-4% of 
peak demand. 
Finally, forward markets exist. These offer the possibility to trade long-term contracts for 
physical delivery or financial hedging against the prices of short-term markets. The liquidity 
of these marketplaces can easily exceed the liquidity of day-ahead markets by a factor of 15 to 
30. Yet, the liquidity of forward contracts with a delivery date of more than three years in the 
future has been negligible and the commitment periods currently available for such contracts 
seldom go far beyond one year. 
One reason for this decrease in liquidity is that many EU markets are faced with overcapacity. 
When there is a lack of demand for new capacity, this is reflected in the liquidity of forward 
markets. Another reason is that risk premiums grow exponentially with the delivery date. 
                                                   
33 See ACER & CEER (2012). 
34 In this context, we use the term market liquidity to compare the volume of power traded in a 
marketplace with the total amount of electricity consumed. This ratio is sometimes also referred to as 
churn rate. 
35 Depending on the supply contract, the demand-side might also be remunerated for not consuming 
and thus effectively acting as a generator. 
Most liquid marketplaces offer: 
 Short-term contracts 
 Remuneration for physical delivery 
Less common marketplaces for: 
 Long-term contracts 
 Remuneration for availability 
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There are no suitable long-term36 hedging instruments – neither for relevant production cost 
factors (price of coal, gas, carbon) nor for the risk of a regulatory intervention. As a result, the 
current demand of end-consumers for long-term contracts is close to zero.  
These four markets – day-ahead, intra-day, balancing power and forward markets37 – 
represent the main elements of the so-called ‘EU target model’ for electricity markets, 
essentially a blueprint to be implemented by all EU member states. 
More recently, some EU member states have implemented or announced their intent to 
implement capacity markets, i.e. markets that explicitly remunerate availability or delivery of 
electricity in times of system stress (see section 4.2 for a more in-depth overview). These kinds 
of markets are currently not foreseen in the EU target model. The EU blueprint is based on a 
so-called ‘energy-only market’. This means the energy delivered or consumed is priced, except 
for balancing power markets where availability might be remunerated explicitly depending 
on national regulation. It is important to note that availability is implicitly remunerated in the 
current framework (see section 3.3). Yet these revenues might not be sufficient to cover all 
fixed costs in case of market failures (see section 4.2) 
3.2 Market coupling and cross-border transmission rights 
Cross-border cooperation and competition has been implemented by coupling national day-
ahead markets. Essentially, this means generators do not have to decide whether to offer their 
production capacity to the domestic or a neighbouring market. To this end, the various 
national market operators combine all demand orders and supply offers. Afterwards, the 
available cross-border transmission capacity is allocated in such a way that the overall costs 
to consumers are minimised. Thus physical transmission rights are allocated implicitly. As of 
June 2015, this approach has been implemented in most EU member states.  
It is also possible to obtain long-term transmission rights explicitly. This can be useful to 
contract cross-border deliveries of electricity for a period longer than one day. Moreover, it 
gives market participants the possibility to hedge themselves against congestion costs. Yet 
transmission rights on national borders can only provide hedging opportunities between two 
price areas, not on a regional level.  
In the current framework, transmission rights must be used day-ahead or will otherwise be 
released to the day-ahead market-coupling algorithm (use-it-or-sell-it principle). It is currently 
not possible to keep these transmission rights for transactions in the intraday market, while 
for balancing power markets they may be reserved under specific circumstances.38 Moreover, 
bilateral agreements exist to allow for some cross-border intraday trading. 
                                                   
36 In this context, a forward period exceeding five years can be considered long-term. 
37 Strictly speaking, the target model does not explicitly reference cross-border forward markets. Still, 
through explicit long-term transmission rights, it is possible to participate in foreign forward markets. 
38 The network code on ‘electricity balancing’ allows for reserving transmission capacity for balancing 
markets subject to cost-benefit analysis. 
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3.3 Price formation 
A shift towards a market-based evaluation of power is at the very core of this liberalisation 
process that was started in 1996. In the case of the day-ahead market, there is a uniform, i.e. 
non-discriminatory, market price for each hour of the day. This price is a result of intersecting 
all offers and bids. Typically, this price is set by the variable production costs of the marginal 
power plant, i.e. the last power plant that is needed to satisfy electricity demand. That means 
all generators receive the same price irrespective of their variable production costs. As a result, 
generation units with variable production costs below the market price receive a so-called 
‘infra-marginal rent’. This margin – typically referred to as gross margin – is used to cover 
fixed operation and maintenance (O&M) costs as well as to recover investment costs. Thus 
availability is implicitly remunerated through infra-marginal rents. 
If market prices were always equal to the variable production costs of the marginal plant, this 
plant would not even be able to cover its fixed O&M costs, let alone recover its investment 
costs. This is why so-called ‘scarcity prices’ are required to let an energy-only market function 
properly.39 Such price increases are expected to occur when supply struggles to meet demand. 
This can happen when consumption peaks, when production from intermittent renewable 
sources is low or when there are large, rapid swings in demand or supply. During these hours, 
the price would rise above variable production costs of the marginal plant and thus offer a so-
called ‘scarcity rent’ to all resources in the market.40 These additional revenues are needed to 
fully recover both fixed O&M and investment costs. A simplified cost-production curve is 
shown in Figure 7. 
                                                   
39 It can be shown that such scarcity prices are needed not just for the marginal production unit but for 
all units in order to recover fixed and investment costs (see Joskow, 2007). Scarcity prices can only occur 
if there is no restriction on the bid price. This means generators must be allowed to bid above marginal 
costs. At the same time, competition authorities must ensure this does not lead to strategic bidding, i.e. 
exercising market power. 
40 It is important to note that scarcity prices are not binary in a competitive market – that is they do not 
jump from the marginal cost of the most expensive generator to the maximum price of a power 
exchange. Instead, the market price is likely to be set by the actual cost to activate voluntary demand-
side resources. 
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Figure 7. Cost-production curve (merit-order) when capacity is scarce 
 
 
3.4 Investment 
An energy-only market attracts investment in new capacity in a number of ways, through 
either direct or indirect reliance on scarcity prices. Indirect reliance refers to market 
participants entering into commercial arrangements with each other in order to hedge their 
exposure to the price and volume risk. In practise, unexpected policy interventions, erroneous 
demand expectations and long lead times for planning and building new capacity lead to 
boom and bust cycles, i.e. times of overcapacity alternate with times of scarce capacity. When 
there is overcapacity, scarcity prices are not going to occur, simply because supply is always 
well above demand, which signals that there is no need for new capacity.41 Scarcity prices can 
also be suppressed, if there is a price cap set too low (see also section 4.2, “Implementing 
scarcity pricing”). 
3.5 Low-carbon investments 
The ETS is foreseen as the primary instrument to incentivise low-carbon investment. Given 
the surplus of carbon allowances in the ETS, the incentive to invest in low-carbon is currently 
limited. There is no price signal for the long-term scarcity of carbon right now. 
                                                   
41 There are other ways in which scarcity pricing can be suppressed or distorted in energy markets, e.g. 
through direct public interventions or through system operators (partly) socialising balancing costs. 
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It is worth noting that at least two-thirds of the capacity, which entered the market in 2000-14, 
did not have to rely on price signals from the market but was supported by dedicated policies 
(see Box 2). The design of these policies greatly varies across the EU with a majority of member 
states granting operating aid, i.e. remunerating the electricity produced.42 A minority of states 
has opted for investment aid, i.e. upfront support at the beginning of the project. The 
performance of policies can be measured in terms of effectiveness and economic efficiency.43 
The first indicator refers to the ability to trigger investment, while the second indicator refers 
to the ability to provide an adequate support level that allows investors to recover their costs 
at a reasonable rate of return. Interestingly, there is empirical evidence that 
overcompensation, i.e. a low economic efficiency, does not necessarily lead to strong market 
growth, i.e. great effectiveness.  
Support schemes featuring long-term contracts (such as a feed-in tariff granted for a duration 
of 10-20 years) have proven to be effective, because the uncertainty about future revenue 
streams is low. Considering that the price of the contract is fixed, there is only a limited 
volume risk, which is determined by the uncertainty about the actual availability of the plant 
and of natural resources, e.g. wind and sun. This high certainty translates into low financing 
costs, which can be significant for such investment due to the cost structure of variable 
renewables such as wind and solar. Since these technologies have close-to-zero variable 
production costs, they are capital-intensive, i.e. costs mostly arise in the planning and 
construction phase of a project. 
The design of support systems has also drawn criticism, mainly in the following three areas. 
First, feed-in tariffs have mainly been set administratively and not in a competitive bidding 
process, which has led to overcompensation in some cases. Second, renewable generators 
have often not been subject to the same responsibilities as other conventional generators, 
particularly when it comes to balancing. Thus balancing costs have implicitly been covered 
by a third party. Third, support systems often lacked a possibility to control the deployment 
volumes. As a result, total support costs sometimes grew faster than envisaged by policy-
makers. 
                                                   
42 See Held et al. (2014). 
43 See Held et al. (2014b). 
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Box 2. Investments in power capacity, 2000-14 
From 2000 to 2014, over 400 GW of new capacity has been deployed in the EU. Of this, 35% 
has been gas, 29% has been wind and 21% has been solar photovoltaic. In total, gas and 
renewables made up for 91% of the new capacity (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8. New installations in power capacity (EU, 2000-14, total: 412.7 GW) 
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4 Critical issues and challenges in finding a suitable solution 
Based on the findings of the previous chapter, critical issues will be identified, followed by a 
discussion of challenges to finding a suitable solution. 
4.1 Critical issues 
Wholesale markets 
There is currently a disconnection between wholesale prices and the full costs of low-carbon 
technologies. Consequently, no market-driven investment decisions will be taken based on 
the current level of wholesale power prices. Yet a technological transformation to a low-
carbon power sector will require considerable new investment, some which will be the 
replacement of existing carbon-intensive capacity with more flexible, less carbon-intensive 
forms of power generation. It is necessary to understand how this will be done.  
There is consensus that renewables will be an important part of this technological 
transformation.44 So far, renewable energy investment has mostly not been triggered by 
wholesale price signals based on internal energy market regulation and the ETS. EU member 
states have primarily relied on dedicated policy instruments to support the deployment of 
renewables.45 Apart from a number of inefficient design choices for these support systems – 
see section 3.5 – many stakeholders and some EU member states consider it cost-effective to 
finance certain renewable energy technologies under long-term contracts because of the cost 
structure of wind and solar. These technologies have close-to-zero variable production costs 
but high upfront investment costs. Consequently, risk has a greater impact on the financing 
costs of such technologies than it has on coal or gas. 
There are two side effects of using dedicated support policies. First, these reduce the demand 
for electricity generated from conventional sources. Second, there is more fluctuation of 
demand for electricity from conventional sources, because renewable generation depends to 
some extent on weather conditions. Decreasing hours of operation of conventional power 
plants create a need for a different mix of conventional generation technologies, as these do 
not just differ in their variable production costs but also in their fixed and investment costs. 
So-called ‘base-load’ capacity is used to cover the minimum continuous level of electricity 
demand, as it has relatively low variable but high fixed and investment costs. Consequently, 
when hours of operation diminish, some base-load would be expected to be replaced with 
capacity that has lower fixed costs (so-called 'mid-merit' and ‘peak-load' capacity).  
The business case of peak-load is generally considered challenging, because investment costs 
have to be recovered from a low number of hours of operation. What’s changing with 
renewables is that (i) more of these units will be needed and (ii) the exact amount required is 
                                                   
44 According to the EU Energy Roadmap, every decarbonisation scenario will feature a high share of 
renewables, i.e. at least 64% in 2050, see SEC(2011) 1565 Parts 1 and 2. 
45 The example of nuclear in the UK shows there is a preference to extend this approach to other low-
carbon technologies. 
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subject to greater uncertainty than today due to the weather-dependent availability of 
renewables. Moreover, in the competition for the remaining market share of mid-merit 
technologies, the more flexible sources with their higher production costs are currently losing 
out and the business case for them is becoming more challenging. 
This comes at a time when Europe seems to be entering a situation where overall demand for 
electricity (even before allowing for renewables) is not growing, and in fact may decline, 
unless other sectors such as heating or transport are electrified. This represents a radical 
change for the industry, which for over 100 years was used to steady growth.  
Retail markets 
The different level and composition of retail prices across EU member states shows that – 
almost 20 years after starting the liberalisation process – the internal energy market remains 
far from complete. National energy taxes, national grid access tariffs and national levies do 
not allow for price conversion at the retail level.  
Furthermore, the current retail pricing mechanism is subject to debate. First, because retail 
prices include cost components that are not related to electricity supply. Second, because the 
retail price structure does not fully reflect the system cost structure. This leads to inefficient 
investment signals (see also section 2.3, “Disincentive to invest in retail storage and demand-
response”). 
4.2 Challenges in finding a suitable solution 
Implementing scarcity pricing 
Scarcity pricing refers to the concept of prices reflecting not only the cost of producing 
electricity but also reflecting, in times of scarcity, the value to consumers of being able to 
consume electricity (see section 3.4). In times of scarce capacity, prices would rise to the level 
reflecting the cost of other measures to balance the system. The resulting price and volume 
risks would spur commercial risk management undertakings by market participants and, 
together with market prices themselves, allow generators to recover their fixed costs.  
Three major barriers to implementing scarcity pricing are generally identified: (i) price caps, 
(ii) market-exit barriers and (iii) a limited exposure of market participants to the risk of 
scarcity.  
Price caps are typically set by regulatory authorities in order to prevent market participants 
from exercising market power in times of scarcity, since a large share of demand is considered 
not (to be able) to react to market price signals. Such lack of demand-response is due to 
technical constraints or retail pricing mechanisms. Generally, dynamic tariffs are required, i.e. 
retailers offering tariffs to consumers that change fairly frequently, e.g. from day to day, in 
order to pass on market signals to them. Right now, most small-scale consumers such as 
households or small enterprises have contracts with flat tariffs that are constant over a 
relatively long period of time, e.g. one month or even one year. Often, such tariffs are the 
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consequence of a technical constraint. For instance, many consumers are not metered in real 
time, as this would require interval or smart meters. As a result, today often it is not possible 
to offer consumers dynamic tariffs.46 Another challenge is the retail pricing mechanism. Even 
if dynamic tariffs can be offered technically, a large part of the retail price simply is not 
dynamic, because retail price components such as taxes and levies are static, i.e. not moving 
over time. This represents a disincentive to shift consumption or invest in storage. 
Price caps may also be introduced on purely political grounds, i.e. as a price control 
instrument. Power exchanges might also define a price cap merely for technical reasons. For 
instance, the price cap of the French or German market is not a legal cap, i.e. it is not imposed 
by a regulator.47  
Whether a price cap represents an actual barrier to implementing scarcity pricing depends on 
the level at which such price caps are set. If the level is above the price that makes consumers 
indifferent to being able to consume and not being able to consume, the cap is not a relevant 
barrier to implementing scarcity pricing. The challenge lies in determining such a price level 
ex ante. In fact, an array of prices would have to be defined, as different consumers have 
different ‘indifference prices’. 
For scarcity pricing to work properly, it is required that the decision when to build or 
decommission capacity is left to market participants and is not a result of an intervention by 
regulators or governments. For instance, in some EU member states regulators need to 
approve the closure (and even mothballing) of power plants48 – even if these are no longer 
profitable or required to maintain resource adequacy. These market-exit restrictions are 
usually justified on the grounds of these power plants being needed for system stability or 
security reasons. Effectively, such a market-exit regulation imposes an implicit cap on 
wholesale market prices, because it maintains overcapacity. The situation is aggravated by the 
fact that there are policies pushing additional capacity into an already-saturated market, e.g. 
support systems for renewables or more recently for nuclear. Consequently, one would expect 
that market participants would take a corresponding amount of capacity offline. While this is 
happening to a certain extent, it is happening at a slower pace than needed to restore market 
equilibrium.  
Finally, market participants are currently not fully exposed to the risk of scarcity. There is a 
disconnection between energy market prices and the concurrent value of scarcity in balancing 
                                                   
46 It is worth noting that much can be achieved already before a large-scale roll-out of smart meters. A 
positive example here is France. In order to reduce peak consumption (especially in winter), the concept 
event pricing is used, i.e. prices being higher during a limited number of days per year when demand is 
expected to be high. Customers are notified via email or text message one day in advance.  
47 It currently amounts to €3,000 per MWh. In 2014, the maximum price observed in the market was 
roughly 3% of the price cap. It is worth noting that the German day-ahead market price has never 
reached this cap since the power exchange was introduced, because the volume of offers was always 
well above the volume of bids.  In France, the cap was reached in four consecutive hours on 19 October 
2009. 
48 This is the case for Spain and Germany, for instance. 
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services. For instance, costs of imbalance are partly socialised instead of being allocated to its 
originator. This puts a limit on the scarcity revenues of generators and reduces the incentive 
to fully hedge against the risk of scarcity. Also, some measures taken at times of system stress, 
such as the activation of voluntary demand-side measures arranged ahead of time, may have 
costs higher than the marginal generator but may not be factored into the formation of market 
prices, implicitly capping scarcity revenues for other resources.49 Yet, it is important to note 
that some of these measures have to be taken at local level by system operators to resolve local 
grid congestion. Consequently, only resources that contributed to resolving the congestion 
should be rewarded. 
Capacity mechanisms 
Capacity mechanisms offer an explicit remuneration for being available or delivering energy 
in times of system stress. For generators, these parallel streams of revenue allow the recovery 
of that portion of their fixed costs that is not recoverable in energy and balancing markets. 
Moreover, the dependency on uncertain scarcity revenues is reduced. 
In the EU and elsewhere, this is not a theoretical debate anymore, as capacity mechanisms 
have been implemented or are in the process of being implemented in several EU member 
states, including France, Germany,50 Italy, Belgium and the UK. They also have a long history 
in South America and in the US, where several states rely on both energy and capacity 
markets. These experiences can provide helpful insights also for the EU debate. 
                                                   
49 One example is the German ordinance on interruptible load (so-called “Lastabschaltverordnung”). 
The availability price for this service was fixed to €2,500 per megawatt per month. 
50 Strictly speaking, there is currently no capacity mechanism in place in Germany. Yet there is a so-
called ‘grid reserve’ (‘Netzreserve’) to make sure that TSOs have access to sufficient ‘redispatch’ 
capacity. Redispatch is a measure to resolve internal grid congestion. Since it provides a capacity-based 
revenue stream for generators, it acts as a kind of de facto capacity mechanism. 
CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON POWER MARKET DESIGN | 29 
 
The design of capacity mechanisms varies across EU member states. Nordic countries and 
Belgium have opted to complement their energy-only market with a strategic reserve, i.e. a 
generator of last resort. In this case, the grid operator contracts a certain amount of capacity 
in a competitive bidding process. This capacity is withheld from the market and is only 
activated when an extreme scarcity event occurs, e.g. triggered by a price.1 Germany has set 
up a ‘light’ strategic reserve (so-called ‘Netzreserve’). Power plants, which generators plan to 
take offline but which are considered relevant for system stability by grid operators, are 
placed into this reserve.1 The mechanism is considered temporary; it will expire by the end of 
2017. There is currently a debate on a suitable follow-up mechanism with a preference to 
implement a strategic reserve. Belgium is currently reviewing its approach in a public 
consultation launched by the Belgian regulator CREG. 
Effectively, a strategic reserve introduces a capacity-based revenue stream for those power 
plants that are placed into the reserve. It is therefore not intended to attract investments. 
In general, the current approaches can be distinguished by the following design questions: 
 What is the product being contracted? (e.g. availability or energy delivered in times of 
system stress) 
 Who is contracting the product and deciding how much of it to buy? (e.g. a grid 
operator or retailers) 
 How long is the forward period, and how long is the commitment period? 
Product-wise, France is contracting availability, while the UK and Italy are contracting energy 
delivery in times of system stress. Most US mechanisms also contract availability.  
The UK and Italy prefer a centralised approach, where a centralised authority sets a 
generation adequacy target. This authority is also the counterparty. France is imposing an 
obligation on retailers to contract enough firm capacity or demand-response to meet the 
consumption profile of their customer portfolio. In the US and South America, where capacity 
markets have been adopted, there has been a preference for centralised approaches, e.g. New 
England, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM), Colombia.  
Commitment periods are rather short in most US mechanisms, i.e. around one year. In the 
UK, 15-year agreements are possible for new capacity and three-year agreements are possible 
for refurbished capacity. In the Italian model, a commitment period of three years is foreseen. 
Dealing with overcapacity 
Some stakeholders also argue that it is mostly the ‘wrong’ type of capacity, which has recently 
been taken offline or mothballed. Announced closures mostly affect capacity, which is not 
profitable to run51 anyway. This is typically the case for gas-fired units. Therefore, the closures 
                                                   
51 In this context, “profitable to run” means a power plant is able to recover its variable production costs 
from selling electricity but not necessarily its (reversible) fixed costs. 
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have no impact on wholesale prices. Instead, closing down coal-fired units would have such 
an impact on prices. 
Although the slow pace of restoring market equilibrium is partly related to existing market-
exit barriers, it is also related to the fact that first-movers are at a disadvantage. Taking 
capacity offline, which is currently profitable to run, will increase wholesale prices overall and 
therefore increase profits for all generators. Yet the net effect for the generator 
decommissioning a power plant can be negative, since his market share might decrease. This 
is illustrated in Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Retirement of existing capacity – impact on prices and market share 
 
Some argue that this development is inconsistent with long-term decarbonisation objectives, 
because it is mostly gas-fired stations that are being retired or mothballed, which may be 
needed in the long run for a transition to a low-carbon power sector. In the context of market 
design, it is important to point out that restoring market equilibrium does not just require 
reducing overcapacity. The right mix of power plant technologies is needed, as these do not 
just differ in their variable production costs but also in their fixed and investment costs.  
Peak-load technologies are used to cover rare peaks in demand. Therefore, their utilisation is 
low. Consequently, these technologies need to have low fixed costs but can have high variable 
costs. Open-cycle gas turbines are typically used for this task. Base-load technologies such as 
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lignite have higher fixed costs but lower variable costs. Consequently, they are used to cover 
the minimum continuous level of electricity demand. Mid-merit technologies are used to 
follow daily and weekly swings in demand and tend to have fixed and operating costs that 
fall in the middle between base-load and peaking plants. 
In order for markets to send efficient price signals, it is essential that there is a balance amongst 
peak-load, mid-merit and base-load technologies.52 
  
                                                   
52 see IEA (2014) 
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5 Inventory of solutions 
When it comes to suitable solutions, opinions vary among stakeholders. In general, one can 
distinguish between recommendations shared among all Task Force members, and non-
consensual options backed by smaller groups within the Task Force.  
5.1 Shared recommendations 
5.1.1 Fully implement the EU target model  
Among stakeholders there is general consensus that fully implementing the EU target model 
is a no-regret action. Significant progress has been achieved when it comes to connecting 
national day-ahead markets (see chapter 3). Similar progress will be needed for intraday and 
balancing markets.  
This will require, as a necessary first step, standardising products as well as harmonising gate 
closure times and price caps in order to facilitate cross-border trade. At a later stage, the various 
national intraday and balancing markets would be fully coupled. This process is currently 
ongoing and not as advanced as the coupling of day-ahead markets. In a joint initiative, power 
exchanges and TSOs from 12 countries plan to create a joint integrated intraday cross-border 
market by the end of July 2017.53 
5.1.2 Do not prescribe the creation of separate flexibility markets; adapt existing 
short-term markets instead 
In general, stakeholders seem to be confident that there is no need for a policy intervention 
that would prescribe the creation of a separate flexibility market, e.g. a market in which the 
ability to react to sudden load changes would be remunerated separately. Flexibility could be 
valued through prices provided by already existing short-term markets (intraday market, 
balancing power market). In principle, this is possible in the existing framework. Flexibility 
has a low value right now, because of overcapacity, undue price caps and the structure of 
balancing prices. Often, these prices do not reflect the real cost of balancing the system. 
Hence, it would not be a matter of introducing ad hoc flexibility markets. Instead, existing 
short-term markets should be implemented properly and developed further. For instance, the 
participation of the demand-side and renewables could be facilitated, as long as these comply 
with the standards for the secure operation of the network. Options are: 
 Ensure all generators are subject to the same balancing obligations. This will increase 
the liquidity and efficiency of balancing power markets. 
 Ensure balancing prices reflect the costs of balancing the system at that time. This will 
provide an incentive to invest in flexible resources on both the demand and the supply 
sides. 
 Shorten the commitment period in balancing power markets, e.g. from a 
monthly/weekly to a daily commitment period provided that system constraints can 
                                                   
53 See XBID (2015). 
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be met. This allows for participation of intermittent and demand-side resources based 
on their expected day-ahead availability.  
 Organise separate tenders for positive and negative balancing power.54 This allows 
for easier participation of the demand side and renewables. For the demand side it is 
typically easier to provide positive power, i.e. reducing demand, than negative 
power, i.e. increasing demand. Conversely, it is typically easier for renewables to 
provide negative balancing power, i.e. curtailing production, than positive, i.e. 
ramping up production. 
 Move gate-closure times55 closer to real time in order to allow renewable energy 
generators to make use of their updated production forecast, while taking into 
account system constraints. 
It is important to note that by introducing fixed payments for capacity, the ability of short-term 
energy markets to adequately price flexibility can be impinged. Unless this issue is addressed, 
this can lead to the need to differentiate the value of different types of capacity in capacity 
remuneration mechanisms or to introduce a specific flexibility mechanism. 
5.1.3 Remove barriers to scarcity pricing 
The expression of scarcity pricing might or might not be made sufficient to attract investment 
in new capacity. However, it is reasonable to remove barriers to scarcity pricing as much as 
possible in any case. This requires removing unnecessary price distortions from energy and 
balancing markets (see section 5.1.2), strengthening the role of demand-response in wholesale 
markets and removing undue market-exit barriers. It is sometimes argued that politicians will 
not be willing to remove price caps in order to prevent unpopular price spikes. In this context, 
it is important to note that 12 neighbouring EU member states have recently announced they 
will not introduce any legal price caps in their markets.56  
Strengthening the role of demand-response in wholesale markets is important so as to enable 
a rational expression of scarcity value and, ultimately, to better estimate the required level of 
firm generation capacity – or in other words, to avoid both excessive price volatility and 
overestimating the need for generation capacity. 
Market-exit barriers, where not justified by system adequacy issues, prolong the current 
overcapacity situation artificially, suppressing wholesale prices and keeping net support costs 
for renewables at a higher level than necessary. 
Finally, it is important to note that generators must be allowed to bid above variable production 
costs for scarcity pricing to work properly. This raises the question of how to distinguish 
between strategic bidding and the recovery of fixed costs. In practice, abusive behaviour can 
                                                   
54 Grid operators use balancing power to keep the balance between production and consumption close 
to real time. Positive balancing power can be provided by generation units ramping up or consumers 
decreasing their load. The opposite is the case for negative balancing power. 
55 This refers to the time until orders and offers can be submitted to a power exchange. 
56 See BMWi (2015). 
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be avoided by ensuring that the market is highly liquid, by having a sufficiently price-elastic 
demand-side in the market and by active monitoring of competition authorities. 
5.1.4 Ensure a clear and cost-effective policy framework for renewables 
The share of renewables in the power sector will continue to grow significantly in the short, 
medium and long terms on the basis of legally binding national targets for 2020 and according 
to the decisions of the European Council from 23-24 October 2014, which has agreed on a new 
set of targets for 2030. For renewables, the target is to reach a share of 27% in final energy 
consumption by 2030. If the power sector will continue to contribute more than other sectors 
to reaching the overall target, the share of renewables in final electricity consumption can be 
expected to be above 45% by 2030.  
Stakeholders agree that it is crucial to have sufficient certainty on how much and when new 
capacity is entering the market through dedicated policy instruments. In the past, this has not 
always been the case, as these dedicated support mechanisms lacked the possibility of 
‘volume control.’ The Guidelines on energy and environmental aid 2014-20 foresee such 
volume control, as they prescribe the use of competitive bidding processes for larger 
installations. This is also expected to increase the overall cost-effectiveness, as the support 
level would be a result of an auction and no longer set administratively. Furthermore, the 
Guidelines require that renewable generators are subject to balancing obligations. 
The European Commission should therefore ensure that national support systems are 
adapted to the Guidelines and set framework guidelines for the period beyond 2020 as soon 
as possible. 
5.2 Non-consensual options 
Several Task Force members are of the opinion that the above-mentioned measures could not 
be sufficient to ensure investment in renewables and other low-carbon technologies as well as 
ensure that enough capacity stays online. Thus the following options are non-consensual.   
5.2.1 Capacity markets 
As outlined earlier, some Task Force members state there is a need to implement capacity 
markets to allow for the recovery of that portion of their fixed costs that is not recoverable in 
energy and balancing markets, thus ensuring security of supply. 
The decision of whether to supplement an energy market with a capacity mechanism is a 
regulatory design choice and ultimately an implementation challenge.  
One key design element of capacity mechanisms that was debated at length in this Task Force 
is the duration of the commitment period. The underlying question is how to allocate risks 
between private investors and the public. In the current framework, the market risk, i.e. the 
price and volume risk, is taken by the investor. Transferring this risk to the public by granting 
long-term contracts would reduce the uncertainty on revenue streams and therefore lower the 
financing costs of an investment. This risk transfer has to be weighed against potential costs 
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for overestimating the demand for new capacity, which would then have to be borne by the 
public and not the investor. It is worth noting that in the context of renewables, many EU 
member states consider long-term contracts cost-effective, as long as there is ex ante 
competition on their level of support. 
National capacity mechanisms are a consequence of security of supply being a predominantly 
national responsibility. At the same time, a European capacity mechanism is likely to ensure a 
higher level of competition and therefore be more cost-effective. 
Resource adequacy if assessed cross-border, e.g. regionally instead of nationally, should help 
avoid over-contracting capacity nationally, when idle capacity exists in neighbouring 
countries. Regarding this specific point, there seems to be growing consensus considering that 
12 neighbouring EU member states have recently announced they are working towards ‘a 
joint regional generation adequacy assessment’.57   
While cross-border participation in national systems would be desired for the sake of better 
functioning of the internal energy market and EU-wide efficiency, to implement it in practice 
might be difficult. For example, it would require that capacity that is contracted cross-border 
is indeed available and able to deliver its service at any time. This might require 
intergovernmental agreements between member states or similar agreements, possibly under 
EU law. Suggestions for explicit participation of cross-border capacity exist58 and should be 
explored, for example in regional initiatives serving as a stepping stone towards an integrated 
EU market. The implementation of regional energy policy cooperation initiatives is a priority 
of both the Energy Union and the “2030 framework for climate and energy policies”.59 
5.2.2 Market-exit signals 
Another issue, which has been discussed at length in this report and elsewhere, is 
overcapacity. Provided that market-exit barriers are removed, there is consensus that excess 
capacity will be retired sooner or later, because it will become economically unviable to keep 
it online, thus resolving the problem of overcapacity.  
Some stakeholders argue that the pace of reducing overcapacity is currently insufficient to 
restore market equilibrium and will not be, as long as there is no mechanism to incentivise the 
decommissioning of existing capacity made redundant by the publicly subsidised addition of 
new, low-carbon capacity.  
The ETS could theoretically provide such a price signal. Yet, in its current state, the ETS is not 
providing any significant decommissioning signal for carbon-intensive power plants. In this 
situation, EU member states have been exploring ways to gradually push redundant plants 
out of the market. Options are carbon price floors, carbon taxes or emissions performance 
                                                   
57 Ibid. 
58 See Mastropietro et al. (2015). 
59 See also de Jong & Egenhofer (2014) as well as CEPS work on regional energy policy cooperation, 
including in south-east Europe: www.ceps.eu/content/Regionalisation-of-EU-energy-policies. 
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standards. A swift adoption and implementation of the Market Stability Reserve proposed for 
the EU ETS is another mechanism for contributing to this goal. Moreover, in some EU member 
states, the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the Industrial Emissions Directive will lead 
to a retirement of existing capacity. 
5.2.3 Cross-border transmission capacity allocation 
There was no consensus regarding the question of how to allocate cross-border transmission 
capacity efficiently between long-term, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. 
Currently, all commercially transmission capacity is allocated to the day-ahead market under 
the use-it-or-sell-it principle. That means that market participants can reserve transmission 
capacity explicitly but are obliged to use it for day-ahead contracts or release it to the day-
ahead market auction where it will be allocated implicitly. It is therefore not possible to 
reserve transmission capacity for cross-border activities in intraday, while for balancing 
power markets it may be reserved under specific circumstances.60 Moreover, bilateral 
agreements exist to allow for some cross-border intraday trading.  
Some stakeholders argue that it would be more efficient to have the possibility to explicitly 
reserve transmission capacity for the intraday market, especially considering that the 
importance of this market is expected to increase with a growing share of intermittent 
renewables. This is because their forecast quality increases while moving closer to the time of 
delivery. Other stakeholders point out that system constraints might not generally allow for 
such an allocation rule. 
5.3 Conclusions 
Many of these solutions are not mutually exclusive but can be combined. For instance, it is 
possible to implement a basic capacity market that provides relatively short forward 
commitments, e.g. one year, in combination with concerted efforts to improve price formation 
in energy and balancing markets.  
It will, however, be important to ensure that market rules are implemented properly and 
consistently. Market-driven investment requires a predictable and credible long-term 
framework. The challenge will be to instil confidence that these rules are in fact stable and 
that market outcomes, especially in terms of wholesale prices and security of supply levels, 
will not eventually trigger a public intervention. In order to achieve this, it is important that – 
irrespective of which approach will be chosen – this framework is based on evidence and 
enjoys the support of the broadest possible stakeholder group.   
                                                   
60 The network code on ‘electricity balancing’ allows for reserving transmission capacity for balancing 
markets subject to cost-benefit analysis. 
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Annex I: Glossary 
Term Description 
Balancing market Marketplace ensuring that deviations between forecast 
and actual production/consumption are balanced 
close to real-time 
Capacity mechanism Explicit remuneration for availability (see also energy 
market) 
Day-ahead market Marketplace for a commodity to be delivered the 
following day 
Dynamic tariff End-consumer price reflecting the dynamics of prices 
at power exchanges (see also static tariff) 
Energy market  Market where the price is based on energy produced / 
consumed 
Energy-only market Energy market without a capacity mechanism 
EU target model Current blueprint for the EU internal energy market 
Flexibility markets Potential marketplace to trade flexibility products (e.g. 
ability to swiftly ramp up production) 
Forward market Marketplace where trading is not very close to real-
time (see also short-term markets) 
Gate-closure time Time until bids can be submitted to an auction 
Generation adequacy (also: 
system/resource adequacy) 
Ability of a power system to meet consumers’ 
requirements at almost all times 
Intra-day markets  Marketplace for a commodity to be delivered close to 
real-time 
Market coupling Initiative connecting national marketplaces in order to 
form a single market 
Market Stability Reserve Supply-side mechanism for the EU ETS 
Negative balancing power (see also 
positive balancing power) 
Demand-side offering to increase consumption or 
supply-side offering to decrease production 
Price cap Upper price limit set by the regulator (“legal”) or a 
power exchange (“technical”) 
Positive balancing power (see also 
negative balancing power) 
Demand-side offering to decrease consumption or 
supply-side offering to increase production 
Scarcity pricing Concept of prices reflecting not only the cost of 
producing electricity but also reflecting, in times of 
scarcity, the value to consumers of being able to 
consume electricity 
Short-term market Marketplace where trading is close to real-time, e.g. 
day-ahead, intraday, balancing (see also forward 
markets) 
Static tariff End-consumer price not reflecting the dynamics of 
prices at power exchanges (see also dynamic  tariff) 
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